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I.  Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the literature on the effects of alcohol regulation on the
adverse consequences of alcohol abuse.  Previous research has considered such outcomes as
cirrhosis mortality (Cook and Tauchen 1982; Saffer 1991); motor vehicle accident mortality
(Saffer and Grossman 1987; Chaloupka, Saffer, and Grossman 1993; Ruhm 1996); failure to
complete college (Cook and Moore 1993a); and drunk driving (Kenkel 1993; Sloan, Reilly, and
Schenzler 1995).  These studies have found that increases in the price of alcohol, which various
levels of government regulate via taxation, lead to reductions in the adverse outcomes just
mentioned.
Our study focuses on the effects of variations in alcoholic beverage prices among states
of the United States on violence on college campuses.   The principal hypothesis tested is that the
incidence of violence is negatively related to the price of alcohol. This hypothesis is derived
from two well established relationships: the positive relationship between alcohol and violence
and the negative relationship between the use of alcohol and its price.  The data employed in the
study are the 1989, 1990, and 1991 Core Alcohol and Drug Surveys of College Students.
Combined these surveys contain almost 120,000 college students from approximately 200
colleges and universities throughout the United States.  They contain measures of the use of
alcohol and the adverse consequences of its use.  These adverse consequences include the
following indicators of violence: getting in trouble with the police, residence hall, or other
college authorities; damaging property or pulling a fire alarm; getting into an argument or a
fight; and taking advantage of another person sexually or having been taken advantage of
sexually.  Our principal finding is that the incidence of each of these four acts of violence is
inversely related to the price of beer in the state in which the student attends college.2
II.  Background
By July 1988, each state of the United States had enacted legislation barring persons
under the age of 21, many of whom are college students, from purchasing and consuming
alcohol.  Despite this legislation, consumption of alcohol by underage youths hardly has been
eliminated.  Approximately 73 percent of all high school seniors consumed alcohol in the past
year in 1996 and 30 percent engaged in binge drinking (consumption of five or more drinks in a
row) in the past two weeks in that year (Johnston, O’Malley, and Bachman 1997).  In 1993, 81
percent of underage college students consumed alcohol in the past year and 45 percent engaged
in binge drinking in the past two weeks (Chaloupka and Wechsler 1996).  The almost annual
occurrence of  the death of at least one fraternity pledge due to alcohol poisoning is a stark
reminder of the extent and serious consequences of alcohol abuse on college campuses.
The role played by alcohol in violence is well known. The National Institute on Alcohol
Abuse and Alcoholism deemed this relationship of sufficient importance to issue a conference
volume dealing with it in 1993 (Martin 1993).  Alcohol is present in a large proportion of violent
events, including between one-half and two-thirds of all homicides and serious assaults involving
adults and adolescents and many reported instances of family violence (Wolfgang 1958; Viscusi
1986; Pernanen 1981, 1991, 1993; Cordilia 1985; Cook and Moore 1993b; Fagan 1993a, 1993b).
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (1988, 1998) highlights this relationship in more detail.  About
half of the inmates in surveys conducted by the BJS drank an average of one ounce or more of
alcohol daily, while only one-tenth of the adult population consumed this quantity.  Over twenty
percent of inmates were consuming the equivalent of nine ounces of 80 proof liquor or eight cans
of beer daily during the year before the crime.  Probationers and inmates reported consuming the
equivalent of between nine and fifteen beers during a period of up to eight hours prior to the3
crime.
Alcohol is more prevalent in violent crimes than in other crimes.  In 1997, about 45
percent of  state prisoners convicted of assault or murder had used alcohol just before
committing the crime (BJS 1999).  On the other hand, about 37 percent of burglars and 27
percent of  drug offenders (those convicted of possession or distribution) used alcohol just prior
to the crime for which they were convicted.
There is no general agreement in the literature concerning the nature of the causality
implied by the positive association between alcohol and violence. Theories range from simple
pharmacological effects to the complex interaction of endocrinological, neurobiologic,
environmental, social and cultural determinants (Goldstein 1985; Reiss and Roth 1993).  For
example, there may exist a psychopharmacological relationship in which alcohol can alter
behavior by increasing excitability and/or boosting courage (Pernanen 1981; Fagan 1993a).
Under this theory, people may be more likely to commit a violent act when under the influence
of alcohol than they would otherwise.  A second theory proposes that alcohol affects the brain in
such a way that people misinterpret social cues with the result of violent reactions (Collins and
Schlenger 1988).  A third theory asserts that people’s reactions to alcohol follow what society
has taught them to believe it does.  For example, in the United States, people are taught that
alcohol and drug use may cause people to lose their inhibitions and/or release violent tendencies,
and thus users cannot be blamed fully for their actions.  In other words, drunkenness may give
people an excuse for aberrant behavior, despite whether or not actual pharmacological effects
exist (Gelles and Cornell 1990).
The theories just summarized indicate that the statistical association between drinking
and violence does not necessarily reflect causality from alcohol consumption to violence. The4
relationship may be due to reverse causality or to differences in one or more “third variables”
that affect both violence and alcohol use in the same direction.  Reverse causality results when
the decision to engage in violent acts stimulates drinking to provide an excuse or to provide
courage. The third variable explanation points to such factors as a risk-seeking personality or a
social environment that encourages deviant behavior (Fagan 1993b).
Prior to the early 1990s economists had contributed little to the phenomenon of alcohol-
related violence.  Cook and Moore (1993b) point out that this can be explained on empirical and
theoretical grounds.  Empirically, economists often are reluctant to focus on relationships in
which the direction and degree of causality appear to be difficult to establish.  Theoretically,
economists typically assume rational behavior, but this assumption may not hold in the case of
alcohol-related violence.
Cook and Moore (1993b) proceed to argue that the rational economic model can be
applied to alcohol-related violence and that this approach has in fact been adopted by researchers
in other disciplines (for example, Pernanen 1991).  Thus, consider a man who deliberately abuses
his wife or child to control their behavior or to increase his share in family resources along the
lines of an economic model of domestic violence proposed by Long, Witte, and Karr (1983) and
by Tauchen, Witte, and Long (1991).  The actual cost of this action is lower if the abuser expects
that his victims will attribute his actions to alcohol rather than directly hold him responsible.  In
the former case, the victims may be more likely to forgive the abuser.  Alcohol can also lower
the perceived costs of violence, many of which occur in the future.  Heavy alcohol consumption
is likely to increase the discount factor that potential offenders apply to future costs.  Thus, it
may make the commission of a violent act more likely.  Cook and Moore (1993b) also refer to  a
model proposed by several economists in which consumers have stable but inconsistent short-run5
and long-run preferences (for example, Schelling 1978; Thaler and Shefrin 1981).  Excessive
alcohol consumption raises the costs of self-management and makes it more likely that decisions
will be dominated by the preferences of the myopic doer rather than by the far-sighted planner.
Although it is not mentioned by Cook and Moore, the rational addiction model developed
by Becker and Murphy (1988) and expanded by Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1991) can also
be used to justify an economic approach to alcohol-related violence.  In the Becker-Murphy
model rational utility-maximizing consumers may become addicted to the consumption of
harmful goods such as cigarettes, illegal drugs, and alcohol consumption.  In their framework
consumers are rational or farsighted in the sense that they anticipate the expected future
consequences of their current actions.  They choose to consume these goods because the
marginal benefit of current consumption exceeds the expected future marginal costs.  These
goods are addictive if an increase in past consumption raises current consumption because it
raises the marginal benefit of current consumption by more than it raises the expected future
marginal costs.  Becker and Murphy also show that a myopic model of addiction--one in which
consumers ignore the future consequences of their current actions--is a special case of their
general approach to addiction.  The key point to note is that alcohol-related violence can be
viewed as an anticipated or unanticipated consequence of the addictive consumption of excessive
amounts of alcohol.
The importance of the economic models of violence summarized by Cook and Moore and
the Becker-Murphy addiction model is that they all contain demand functions for alcohol in
which the quantity of alcohol demanded by an individual is negatively related to its price and to
other exogenous determinants such as income and tastes or preferences.  Chaloupka and Saffer
(1992), Cook and Moore (1993b), and Markowitz and Grossman (1998, 1999) have used this6
approach to estimate reduced form violence equations that result when alcohol consumption, an
endogenous variable in a structural violence equation, is replaced by its determinants.  Both
Chaloupka and Saffer (1992) and Cook and Moore (1993b) investigate the effects of variations
in beer tax rates among states of the United States on various crime rates from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) in a time series of state cross sections
for the period 1975 through 1990 (Chaloupka and Saffer) and for the period 1979 through 1987
(Cook and Moore).  Both include the violent crimes of murder, rape, assault, and robbery; while
Chaloupka and Saffer also consider burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.  Cook and Moore
adopt a fixed-effects specification in which the only regressors other than the beer tax are
dichotomous variables for each state except one and each year except one.  Saffer and Chaloupka
adopt a more fully specified model of the determinants of crime.  Both studies find that increases
in beer tax rates lead to statistically significant reductions in most of the crime rates.  For
example, Chaloupka and Saffer predict that a doubling of the federal beer tax would reduce
murders by 3 percent, rapes by 3 percent, robberies by 4.7 percent, and burglaries and thefts by
1.3 percent each.  Cook and Moore estimate that a 10 percent increase in the state beer tax rate
would reduce murder and assaults by 0.3 percent each, rapes by 1.3 percent, and robbery by 0.9
percent.
Markowitz and Grossman (1998) use the 1976 National Family Violence Survey to
examine the effects of variations in state beer tax rates on the incidence and amount of severe
and overall violence directed at children by parents.  Acts of severe violence include kicking,
biting or hitting with fist; hitting or trying to hit with something; beating up the child; threatening
with a gun or knife; or using a knife or gun.  Overall violence includes these behaviors as well as
the minor acts of violence of throwing something at the child and pushing, grabbing or shoving7
the child.  We find that a 10 percent increase in the beer tax will reduce the probability of severe
violence by 2.3 percent, the probability of overall violence by 1.2 percent, and the number of
violent acts by parents who commit these acts by 1.6 percent.  By pooling data from the 1985
and 1976 National Family Violence Surveys with a set of state dummies, Markowitz and
Grossman (1999) show that the negative tax effects are not due to unobserved state factors.
III.  Analytical Framework
We adopt the framework employed in our previous studies (Markowitz and Grossman
1998, 1999) to generate reduced form equations for acts of violence committed by students on
college campuses.  Our framework is sufficiently broad to accommodate cases in which the
violence caused by alcohol consumption or excessive consumption yields negative utility and
cases in which violence or the power, control, or other outcome that it produces is a positive
source of utility.  In the former case the negative consequences can be anticipated or
unanticipated.  If they are anticipated, the positive marginal utility of alcohol consumption must
outweigh the negative marginal utility of violence.  If the consequences are unanticipated,
alcohol consumption can be positive even if this condition is not satisfied.  Whether the
consequences are anticipated or unanticipated, by the law of the downward-sloping demand
function, an increase in the price of alcohol causes a reduction in consumption and a reduction in
violence.
1
The above ideas are formalized in a three-equation econometric model.  The first
equation is a structural equation for violence:
v = v(a, x).  (1)
Here v is a measure of violence, a is alcohol consumption and x is a vector of demographic,8
socioeconomic, and personal characteristics.  Some of the members of the x vector, such as a
risk-seeking personality or a social environment that encourages deviant behavior, are not
observed.  The second equation is a demand function for alcohol:
a = a(p, y), (2)
where p is the price of alcohol and y is a vector of other determinants of consumption.
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1), one obtains a reduced form violence equation:
v = v(p, x, y). (3)
We estimate the demand function and the reduced form violence equation by ordinary
least squares.  Our focus is on the third equation and on the coefficient of the price of alcohol in
that equation.  In addition we estimate equation (1), the structural violence equation, in which
alternative acts of violence depend on alcohol consumption--an endogenous right-hand side
variable.  We estimate this equation by two-stage least squares for two reasons.   First, the
vectors x and y may share common unobserved variables.  Second, as noted in Section II, the
relationship between alcohol consumption and violence may be due in part to reverse causality
from violence to consumption.  In either case, the disturbance term in the equation is correlated
with observed alcohol consumption.  Identification is achieved in the context of the two-stage
least squares approach by imposing the restriction that the price of alcohol should have no
impact on violence with alcohol consumption held constant.
IV.  Data and Empirical Implementation
Data on criminal behavior on college campuses, alcohol consumption, and individual
student characteristics come from the 1989, 1990, and 1991 Core Alcohol and Drug Surveys of
College Students (hereafter termed the Core Surveys), conducted by the University of Southern9
Illinois's Core Institute (a Center for Alcohol and Drug Studies) and described in detail by
Presley, Meilman, and Lyerla (1993, 1995) and by Presley et al. (1996).  Each of the three
surveys contains approximately 50,000 college students.  Taken together, 238 different colleges
from 46 states are represented in the three surveys.  These are colleges receiving two-year grants
from the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) of the U.S. Department
of Education to establish substance abuse programs.  Student demographics at these colleges are
similar to those of American colleges and universities generally.  The Core Institute requested
that FIPSE colleges administer the Core Survey on their campuses prior to the establishment of
the substance abuse program using representative sampling techniques.  The  survey focuses on
the use of alcohol and illegal drugs and on the consequences of this use.
For reasons of confidentiality, the only information on the college available to us is the
state in which it is located.  Moreover, the information on student and family background
characteristics (described below) is limited.  Therefore, to control for unmeasured factors and to
avoid distorting trends, we restrict the sample to colleges in one of the 29 states that was in the
1989 survey.
2  These states accounted for 80 percent of the population of the United States in
1990.  Our final sample contains 122,416 students from 191 colleges and universities.
Definitions, means, and standard deviations of all variables employed in the regressions
in Section IV are given in Table 1.  Dichotomous indicators of the incidence of four alternative
types of violent behavior due to drinking or illegal drug use in the past year are employed as
outcomes in linear probability regression models.
3  They are: getting in trouble with the police,
residence hall, or other college authorities (termed trouble); damaging property, pulling a fire
alarm, etc. (termed damage); getting into an argument or a fight (termed fight); and taking
advantage of another person sexually or having been taken advantage of sexually (termed sexual10
advantage).  Their incidence rates are 12.4 percent for trouble, 7.6 percent for damage, 31.3
percent for fight, and 14.4 percent for sexual advantage.
4  Some behaviors in the first category
(trouble) may be more appropriately categorized as mischief rather than as crime, and the first
two outcomes (trouble and damage) do not necessarily involve violent behavior.  We use the
term violence to describe all four behaviors because the simple correlations among them, which
range from 0.23 to 0.36, are fairly high.  Moreover, persons who break laws governing non-
violent behavior may be more likely to  break laws governing violent behavior. 
Due to the way in which the violence questions are worded, respondents are supposed to
be reporting behavior caused by the use of alcohol or illegal drugs.  This increases the value of
these behaviors in assessing the effects of changes in the cost of alcohol on violence but
decreases their value in assessing the overall contribution of alcohol abuse to violence.  Of
course, violence can be caused by more than one factor, and alcohol is present in a large
proportion of violent and non-violent criminal events as indicated in Section I.  Thus, on balance
the benefits of wording the questions in this manner may outweigh the costs.
5
Most of the victims of sexual advantage are females, and most of the perpetrators are
males.  The sample size for the sexual advantage outcome is much smaller than the sample sizes
for the other three outcomes because the question was asked exactly as it appears in Table 1 in
1989.  In 1991 taking advantage of another person sexually and being taken advantage of
sexually by another person were reported as separate items.  In 1990 approximately 11 percent of
the sample were asked the new question, while the rest were asked the old question.  The data
that we received from the Core Institute did not contain the responses to the old question.  For
1990 and 1991 we created a single indicator of sexual advantage that equals one if at least one of
the two separate indicators equals one.  Note that gender-specific regressions did not indicate11
differences in slope coefficients.
Alcohol consumption is given by the average number of drinks consumed in a week.  The
mean value is 4.75 drinks per week and 7.92 drinks per week for the 60 percent of the sample
that reported a positive number of drinks per week.  This figure does not imply that 40 percent of
the sample were abstainers because roughly 85 percent of the students consumed alcohol in the
past year.  These numbers suggest that 25 percent of the respondents consumed some alcohol in
the past year but less than one drink per week.
6
Alcohol consumption in the Core also can be measured by the incidence of binge
drinking in the past two weeks (consumption of five or more drinks in a row) and by the number
of such occasions.  Forty percent of students engage in this behavior.  The mean number of
occasions is 1.28 for the whole sample and 3.19 for bingers.  The incidence of binge drinking
and the number of occasions are highly correlated with the number of drinks per week (r = 0.530
and r = 0.734, respectively).  We do not use them as alternative measures of consumption
because the violence outcomes pertain to the past year.  Preliminary estimates that did employ
them were very similar to the results presented in Section IV.
Student characteristics employed as independent variables in the regressions include age;
class year (sophomore, junior, senior, graduate student, or non-matriculated student);
race/ethnicity (black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, or other); gender; marital status (married or
divorced); part-time student status; work status (full-time or part-time); and type of residence
(on-campus housing but not in a fraternity or sorority, fraternity/sorority, or on-campus but type
unknown).  The only parental variables are indicators that the mother has alcohol/drug problems
and that the father has alcohol/drug problems.
7  Finally, all models include dichotomous
variables for the years 1990 and 1991.12
The price of alcohol is given by the real price of beer in 1982-84 dollars in the state in
which the college is located.  The price of beer is selected because beer is the most heavily
consumed alcoholic beverage and because beer is the beverage of choice among college students.
The money price of beer is taken from the Inter-City Cost of Living Index, published quarterly
by the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA various years) for
between 250 and 300 cities.  The specific beer price collected by ACCRA is the price of a six-
pack (six-12 ounce cans) of Budweiser or Miller Light.
8  In addition to obtaining information on
the prices of a variety of consumer goods, the ACCRA constructs a city-specific cost of living
for each city with an average for all cities in a given quarter and year equal to one.
The Core Surveys were conducted during the fall semesters of 1989, 1990, and 1991.
Since the violence outcomes pertain to the previous year, the beer price in the survey year is
given as a four-quarter average of the prices in the first two quarters of the survey year and the
last two quarters of the previous year.  Before averaging, each quarterly price is converted to a
real price by dividing it by a quarter- and city-specific cost of living index.  This index is the
ACCRA city-specific cost of living index multiplied by the quarterly Bureau of Labor Statistics’
CPI for the U.S. as a whole (1982-84 = 1).  Quarterly state prices are then computed as
population weighted averages of city prices, and annual prices are obtained by averaging these
prices over the four relevant quarters.
In interpreting the results in Section IV, one should bear in mind that the real price of
beer is subject to measurement error for a variety of reasons.  The price data pertain to the state
in which the respondent attends college rather than to the city in which the college is located.  In
addition, the cost of living index reflects expenditure patterns of midmanagement (middle-
income) households.   These patterns may differ from those of college students.  Random13
measurement error in an independent variable biases its coefficient and t-ratio toward zero.
Thus, the price coefficients and associated t-ratios in Section IV are conservative lower-bound
estimates.  With regard to the t-ratios, a factor that goes in the opposite direction is that
conventional standard errors on which they are based do not take account of possible correlations
among disturbances terms of students in the same college.  Given positive correlations in these
disturbance terms, t-ratios based on robust or Huber (1967) standard errors are smaller than the
conventional or unadjusted t-ratios.  If there is no measurement error in price and positive
correlations among disturbance terms, unadjusted t-ratios are overstated, but this is not
necessarily the case in the presence of measurement error.
We report both conventional and Huber t-ratios in the tables in the next section.  In
computing the latter, we use the college as the grouping factor.  In the text we use conventional t-
ratios in assessing statistical significance because we think that measurement error in the price is
an important phenomenon.  We realize, however, that the reader’s views of this issue may differ
from ours and provide enough information to allow him or her to evaluate significance based on
Huber t-ratios.
Several other state-specific variables are included in some of the regression models.
State real per capita income in 1982-84 dollars is a proxy for the student’s income or his or her
family income.  If alcohol consumption or excessive consumption has a positive income
elasticity, an increase in income should lead to more violence.  A factor that goes in the opposite
direction is that income may be positively correlated with the opportunity cost of the time spent
in violence.  Money per capita income by state is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(various years).  It is deflated by a state- and year-specific cost of living index obtained by
multiplying the quarterly ACCRA cost of living index multiplied by the CPI for the U.S.,14
obtaining population weighted averages at the state level, and then averaging over the four
relevant quarters.
The per capita number of outlets that are licensed to sell alcoholic beverages for
consumption on the premises, off the premises, or on and off the premises is a negative correlate
of the amount of travel time required to purchase alcohol and should have positive effects on
consumption and violence.  The measure pertains to 1992 and is taken from Jobson Publishing
Corporation (1993).
Violent behavior may depend on the use of illegal drugs as well as on the use of alcohol.
The nature of the relationship, however, is ambiguous for reasons discussed in Markowitz and
Grossman (1998, 1999).  Since we focus on reduced form violence equations, illegal drug prices
rather than quantities are the relevant regressors.
9  Between 1976 and 1978, eleven states
decriminalized the possession of small amounts of marijuana.  This results in a lower full price
of consuming marijuana in these states.  We include a dichotomous variable that identifies
students who attend colleges in these states.  The sign of the coefficient of this variable is
ambiguous.  It depends on whether alcohol and marijuana are substitutes or complements.  It also
depends on the sign of the effect of marijuana consumption on violence and, if the effect is
positive, on its magnitude relative to the magnitude of the alcohol effect.  The decriminalization
indicator is taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1985).
To take account of the potential role of “drinking sentiment” in the endogenous
determination of alcoholic beverage prices, alcohol consumption, and violence, the percentages
of the state population who are Mormons, Southern Baptists, Catholics, Protestants (excluding
Mormons and Southern Baptists), and Jewish are included in one specification of the model.
The omitted category pertains to the percentage of the population with no religion.  Drinking15
sentiment refers to cultural and taste factors that may either encourage or discourage alcohol
consumption.  For example, antidrinking sentiment should be relatively widespread in states in
which those religious groups that oppose the use of alcohol, such as Mormons and Southern
Baptists, are prevalent.  These states may enact high excise tax rates on beer as part of the
political process.  In this situation the price coefficients that emerge from regressions that omit
drinking sentiment overstate in absolute value the true parameters.
10
For several reasons, caution should be exercised in interpreting the regressions that
include the religion variables.  First, our estimates pertain to college students who may play a
much smaller role in the political process determining prices and taxes than older adults.
Second, an individual’s drinking sentiment is the key measure that determines his or her
consumption of alcohol.  With this variable held constant, there is little reason why state
sentiment should have an impact on consumption.  A student’s sentiment towards alcohol may
be reflected quite well by the decision to live in a fraternity/sorority and by parental alcohol
behavior.  Thus, the price effects are not necessarily biased by the omission of the religion
variable.
11
For 1990 the religion variables except for the percentage Jewish are taken from Bradley
et al. (1992).  For 1989 and 1991, they are taken from interpolations and extrapolations of state-
specific logarithmic time trends between 1980 and 1990.  The 1980 data are reported by Quinn et
al. (1982).  The percentage Jewish is taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (various
years).
V.  Empirical Results
Table 2 contains reduced form violence regressions for the probability of getting into
trouble with the police, residence hall, or other college authorities (trouble) and for the16
probability of damaging property, pulling a fire alarm, etc. (damage).  Table 3 contains similar
regressions for the probability of an argument or fight (fight) and for the probability of having
been taken advantage of sexually or having taken advantage of another person sexually (termed
sexual advantage).  Table 4 contains reduced form demand functions for the number of drinks of
alcohol in a week.  Three models are estimated for each of these five outcomes.  In the first
model, the only state-specific variable is the real beer price.  In the second, real per capita
income and the per capita number of outlets that are licensed to sell alcohol are added as
regressors.  In the third, the five religion measures are included.
The most important result in these three tables is that the beer price coefficients are
always negative and are significant in 14 of the 15 regressions.  The only exception pertains to
the sexual advantage regression that includes the religion variables.  This finding is consistent
with the hypothesis that an increase in the cost of alcohol lowers violence because it lowers
alcohol consumption.  The beer price effects are reduced in absolute value when the other state-
specific variables are included.  In general these reductions are largest when the religion
variables are employed as regressors.  The ratio of the price coefficient in model 1 to the
corresponding coefficient in model 3 is 1.04 for trouble, 1.64 for damage, 1.29 for fight, 7.75 for
sexual advantage, and 1.25 for the number of drinks.
The coefficient of real per capita income is positive in all models except when damage is
the outcome and the religion variables are held constant and significant except in the damage
equations.  The coefficient of the number of licensed outlets is positive except when trouble is
the outcome and the religion variables are not held constant and is significant in each case in
which it is positive except in the trouble equation.  There is little evidence that marijuana
decriminalization has an impact on violence or alcohol consumption.17
The effects of the religion variables do not show a consistent pattern and are difficult to
interpret.  For example, an increase in the percentage of the population who are Mormons or
Southern Baptists increases alcohol consumption rather than reduces it.  The coefficients of these
two variables do not have stable signs in the violence equations.  The Mormon coefficient is
positive in the trouble regression and negative in the damage, fight and sexual advantage
regression.  The Southern Baptist coefficient is negative except when fight is the outcome.  The
Protestant and Catholic coefficients are consistently positive and significant, but it is not clear
whether these are true effects or effects of variables correlated with these two measures.  The
Jewish measure is usually positive and insignificant.  On balance, we prefer the models that
exclude the religion variables.  We realize, however, that the reader may have different views on
this issue, and we give equal weight to models that include and exclude the religion variables in
summarizing the magnitudes of the price effects below.
Many of the student characteristics are important determinants of alcohol consumption
and violence.  We want to call attention to the differentials associated with living in a
fraternity/sorority or in having a mother or father with alcohol/drug problems.  Students who
reside in a fraternity/sorority have approximately 6 more drinks per week than students who live
off-campus and have approximately 5 more drinks per week than students who reside in a
dormitory.  The presence of a mother with alcohol/drug problems is associated with 1 extra drink
per week and the presence of a father is associated with slightly more than one-half extra drink
per week.  The coefficients of these three variables always are positive and significant in the
violence equations.
Table 5 contains price, income, and outlet elasticities of the five outcomes considered in
Tables 2, 3, and 4 at the sample means.  The price elasticity of the number of drinks of alcohol18
ranges between -0.74 and -0.98 with a mean of -0.89.
12  This estimate is in the range of those in
the published literature for young adults.  Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1998) report a
price elasticity of -0.65 for the number of drinks in the past year for persons between the ages of
19 and 27, not all of whom are in college.
13  Kenkel (1993) estimates a price elasticity of
-2.24 for the number of days in the past year on which a person between the ages of 18 and 21
had five or more drinks.
14  Our income elasticity of the number of drinks of 0.63 is substantial,
but the income measure employed in the regressions may be a poor proxy for the student’s
command of resources.  The outlet elasticity of alcohol consumption of 0.33 is much smaller
than the price or income elasticities.
The elasticity of each of the four violence outcomes with respect to the beer price is -0.48
for trouble, -0.52 for damage, -0.33 for fight, and -0.36. for sexual advantage.  Consider an
exactly identified model in which the beer price is the only variable omitted from the structural
violence equation.  In this model, the implied elasticity of violence with respect to alcohol
consumption is 0.54 for trouble, 0.58 for damage, 0.37 for fight, and 0.40 for sexual advantage.
Table 6 contains actual estimates of structural violence equations by two-stage least
squares for trouble and damage, and Table 7 contains similar estimates for fight and sexual
advantage.  The number of drinks of alcohol is treated as an endogenous variable in these
estimates. The three models for each outcome correspond to the three models in Tables 2 and 3.
In model 1 the beer price is the only instrument for alcohol consumption (the only variable
included in the first stage but excluded from the second stage).  In models 2 and 3, the
instruments are the beer price and the number of outlets.  The treatment of income is somewhat
controversial.  If income affects violence solely through alcohol consumption, it should be
excluded from the second stage.  We include it to capture omitted endogenous and exogenous19
factors that may determine violence.  Similar comments can be made with regard to such student
characteristics as residence in a fraternity/sorority and the presence of a parent with alcohol/drug
problems.
Alcohol consumption has a positive and significant coefficient in all twelve models in
Tables 6 and 7.  According to the Wu (1973) F test, the consistency of ordinary least squares
estimation of the structure is rejected in four cases but accepted in eight cases at the five percent
level.  Therefore, it is worth considering both the OLS and the TSLS elasticity of each of the
violence outcomes with respect to alcohol consumption.  These are shown in Table 8.  The TSLS
elasticity is 0.40 for trouble, 0.63 for damage, 0.39 for fight, and 0.33 for sexual abuse.  The
corresponding OLS elasticities are 0.48, 0.58, 0.27, and 0.30.  These elasticities do not
dramatically differ from each other or from those that are implied by the exactly identified model
that was described above.
In summary our results are consistent with a causal mechanism in which the price of
alcohol affects violence because it affects the consumption of alcohol.  These results do not
indicate whether violence is an anticipated or unanticipated consequence of alcohol
consumption.  They also do not indicate whether alcohol consumption is treated by students as
an input to facilitate violent behavior or as an anticipated negative consequence that is
outweighed by the positive benefits derived from its consumption.  What they do suggest is that
alcohol regulatory variables may influence the general level of violence20
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1 If the consequences are anticipated and have monetary penalties, the quantity of alcohol
demand and the amount of violence depend on these penalties as well as on the price of alcohol.
A model in which violence is a positive source of utility formalizes the notion that the decision
to engage in violent acts can stimulate alcohol consumption because consumption raises
productivity or lowers the cost of violence.  Here we assume that violence is produced by two
endogenous inputs: alcohol consumption and the own time of the perpetrator.  For more details,
see Markowitz and Grossman (1998, 1999).27
2 The states included are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.  Maine and New Jersey
are omitted because the price of beer was missing for these two states in 1989.
3 Given the large sample size, little is gained by fitting logit or probit models.  The
number of occasions of each type of violence in the past year also is reported, but we have not
yet exploited this information.
4 Each rate was computed after deleting observations with missing values.  The same
comment applies to the mean value of the number of drinks of alcohol in a week in Table 1.
5 One caveat to the above argument pertains to a situation in which violence that does not
involve alcohol is positively related to the price of alcohol.  This case is extremely unlikely. If,
however, it does occur, price may have no effect on all types of violence even if it has a negative
effect on alcohol-related violence.  The more likely case is the one that we implicitly assume: no
relationship between price and violence not involving alcohol.
6 Respondents could not indicate that they consumed alcohol but consumed less than one
drink per week in answering the question pertaining to drinks per week.
7 Except for type of residence, the small number of missing values for the variables just
listed are replaced by sample means.  A change in the questions determining type of residence
between 1989 and 1990 generated a large number of cases in which a student lived on-campus,
but it could not be determined whether the residence was a dormitory or a fraternity/sorority.
8 Prior to the fourth quarter of 1989, the brands of beer were Budweiser and Schlitz.28
Prices for quarters prior to the fourth quarter of 1989 were adjusted based on the trend in the
mean ACCRA beer price for the U.S. as a whole between the third and fourth quarters of 1989
relative to the trend in the U.S. beer price index reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
9 The Core Surveys contain information on the use of marijuana, cocaine, and other
illegal drugs.  They are relevant endogenous regressors in the structural violence equation, but
we have not yet exploited these variables.
10 The bias could go in the other direction if states in which prodrinking sentiment is
widespread (antidrinking sentiment is weak) and alcohol consumption is large enact higher beer
taxes because the taxation of beer is an attractive source of revenue.
11 We limit the number of state-specific regressors because Markowitz and Grossman
(1998, 1999) report that such additional determinants of alcohol consumption and violence as
restrictions on alcohol advertising, permission of beer sales by grocery stores, the percentage of
the state’s population residing in counties that prohibit the sale of alcohol, and the price of
cocaine have little impact on the outcomes they consider.  Clearly, measures that vary by state
alone are likely to be collinear.  Thus, the degree of multicollinearity in the data is reduced by
curtailing the number of state-specific regressors.
12 In the remainder of this section, all elasticities mentioned in the text are averages of
those that emerge from the three alternative models employed for a given dependent variable.
13 Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan’s indicator of the number of drinks in the past year
is measured subject to error because it is computed as the product of the number of drinking
occasions in the past year and the number of drinks consumed on typical occasion.  The latter is
inferred from the response to a question concerning how often the respondent drinks enough to29
feel pretty high.  For this reason and others, their dependent variable is not entirely comparable
to our dependent variable.
14 This is an average of the separate estimates that Kenkel reports for males and females.
When we employ the number of days in the past two weeks on which an individual consumed
five or more drinks in a row as an outcome, we obtain a price elasticity of -0.78.28
Table 1
Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
(n=120,864 except where otherwise indicated)
Variable Definition Mean, Standard Deviation
Trouble
a Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent had been in trouble with
police, residence hall or other college
authorities due to drinking or drug use in
the past year
0.123, 0.329
          (n=115,752)
Damage
a Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent had damaged property,
pulled fire alarm, etc. due to drinking or
drug use in the past year
0.075, 0.264
          (n=115,471)
Fight
a Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent got into an argument or fight
due to drinking or drug use in the past
year
0.312, 0.463
          (n=115,061)
Sexual advantage
a Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent had been taken advantage of
sexually or had taken advantage of
another sexually due to drinking or drug
use in the past year
0.143, 0.350
           (n=86,801)
Number of drinks
a Average number of drinks consumed in a
week.  (A drink is a bottle of beer, a
glass of wine, a wine cooler, a shot glass
of liquor or a mixed drink)
4.709, 8.734
           (n=118,177)
Real beer price Real annual beer price in 1982-1984
dollars
2.488, 0.219
Real income State real per capita income 10079.710, 1048.430
Number of licensed outlets per capita State per capital number of retail outlets
licensed to sell beer, wine or spirits in a
state
0.002, 0.001
Marijuana decriminalization Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent resides in a state in which
incarceration and heavy fines are not
penalties for most marijuana possession
offenses
0.432, 0.495
Mormon Percentage of the state population who
are Mormon
1.839, 8.189
Southern Baptist Percentage of the state population who
are Southern Baptist
3.984, 6.251
Protestant Percentage of the state population who
are Protestant
21.028, 9.125
Catholic Percentage of the state population who
are Catholic
22.255, 12.182
Jewish Percentage of the state population who
are Jewish
2.392, 2.619
Age Respondent’s age 22.913, 6.935
Sophomore Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is a sophomore
0.229, 0.417Table 1 (continued)
29
Junior Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is a junior
0.186, 0.385
Senior Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is a senior
0.181, 0.382
Graduate student Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is seeking a graduate or
professional degree
0.058, 0.232
Non-matriculated Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is not seeking a degree
0.027, 0.160
Black Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is black, non-Hispanic
0.050, 0.215
Hispanic Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is Hispanic
0.048, 0.210
Other race Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is of another race/ethnicity
0.076, 0.261
Female Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is female
0.589, 0.473
Married Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is married
0.134, 0.339
Divorced Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is divorced
0.042, 0.199
Part-time student Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent attends school part-time
0.140, 0.343
Works full-time Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent works full-time
0.134, 0.336
Works part-time Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent works part-time
0.460, 0.492
Lives in on-campus housing Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent lives in on-campus housing
0.357, 0.479
Lives in a fraternity/sorority Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent lives in a fraternity or
sorority
0.017, 0.131
On campus residence unknown Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent lives in on-campus housing,
but type of housing is unknown
0.210, 0.407
Mother has alcohol/drug problems Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent’s mother had alcohol or drug
problems
0.054, 0.227
Father has alcohol/drug problems Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent’s father had alcohol or drug
problems
0.159, 0.366
1990 Dichotomous indicator for survey year
1990
0.271, 0.445
1991 Dichotomous indicator for survey year
1991
0.261, 0.439
aMean and standard deviation based on a sample that excludes unknown values.30
Table 2
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R-squared 0.059 0.060 0.062 0.059 0.059 0.061
F-statistic 316.905 283.417 246.448 313.744 278.728 239.908
a t-statistics in parentheses, Huber t-statistics in brackets, and intercepts not shown.32
Table 3






(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































R-squared 0.063 0.064 0.068 0.029 0.029 0.030
F-statistic 338.811 303.887 272.181 110.989 98.579 86.554





Average Number of Drinks Per Week
(1) (2) (3)

















































































































































































































































R-squared 0.100 0.102 0.107
F-statistic 568.390 513.464 454.585
a t-statistics in parentheses, Huber t-statistics in brackets, and intercepts not shown.36
Table 5















Price -0.500 -0.457 -0.477
Income 0.733 0.444
Number of outlets 0.002 0.124
DAMAGE
Price -0.590 -0.624 -0.354
Income 0.108 -0.029
Number of outlets 0.180 0.276
FIGHT
Price -0.360 -0.362 -0.281
Income 0.474 0.330
Number of outlets 0.115 0.159
SEXUAL ADVANTAGE
Price -0.532 -0.485 -0.076
Income 0.289 0.414
Number of outlets 0.028 0.116
NUMBER OF DRINKS
Price -0.931 -0.985 -0.744
Income 0.638 0.619
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R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.068 0.064 0.065 0.066
F-statistic 344.887 313.102 276.554 338.922 312.916 267.296
Wu F-ratio 0.513 11.676 1.263 0.122 0.415 0.211
aAsymptotic t-statistics in parentheses, Huber t-statistics in brackets, and intercepts not shown.  For
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R-squared 0.068 0.069 0.073 0.029 0.030 0.031
F-statistic 358.383 333.723 297.701 113.045 105.672 92.117
Wu F-ratio 5.443 11.276 9.678 1.419 0.099 0.893
aAsymptotic t-statistics in parentheses, Huber t-statistics in brackets, and intercepts not shown.  For
Wu F test, critical values of F (1, ¥) are 3.84 at 5 percent and 6.64 at 1 percent.41
Table 8















Two-stage least squares 0.544 0.254 0.397
Ordinary least squares 0.477 0.477 0.476
DAMAGE
Two-stage least squares 0.629 0.642 0.628
Ordinary least squares 0.585 0.585 0.583
FIGHT
Two-stage least squares 0.388 0.391 0.384
Ordinary least squares 0.269 0.269 0.266
SEXUAL ADVANTAGE
Two-stage least squares 0.457 0.304 0.236
Ordinary least squares 0.304 0.304 0.302